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312Objective: There is general enthusiasm for applying strategies from aviation directly to medical care; the appli-
cation of the ‘‘sterile cockpit’’ rule to surgery has accordingly been suggested. An implicit prerequisite to the ev-
idence-based transfer of such a concept to the clinical domain, however, is definition of periods of high mental
workload analogous to takeoff and landing. We measured cognitive demands among operating room staff, map-
ped critical events, and evaluated protocol-driven communication.
Methods: With the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index and semistructured focus
groups, we identified common critical stages of cardiac surgical cases. Intraoperative communication was as-
sessed before (n ¼ 18) and after (n ¼ 16) introduction of a structured communication protocol.
Results: Cognitive workload measures demonstrated high temporal diversity among caregivers in various roles.
Eight critical events during cardiopulmonary bypass were then defined. A structured, unambiguous verbal com-
munication protocol for these events was then implemented. Observations of 18 cases before implementation in-
cluding 29.6 hours of cardiopulmonary bypass with 632 total communication exchanges (average 35.1
exchanges/case) were compared with observations of 16 cases after implementation including 23.9 hours of car-
diopulmonary bypass with 748 exchanges (average 46.8 exchanges/case, P¼ .06). Frequency of communication
breakdowns per case decreased significantly after implementation (11.5 vs 7.3 breakdowns/case, P ¼ .008).
Conclusions: Because of wide variations is cognitive workload among caregivers, effective communication can
be structured around critical events rather than defined intervals analogous to the sterile cockpit, with reduction in
communication breakdowns. (J Thorac Cardiovasc Surg 2010;139:312-9)Effective communication is a critical precondition of effec-
tive teamwork and high-reliability performance in high-
risk and high-consequence environments such as the cardiac
surgical operating room (OR). It is therefore not surprising
that breakdowns in communication in the OR have been
linked to worse surgical outcomes.1,2 In an interview study
of consultant surgeons, incomplete, nonexistent, or errone-
ous communication was a causal factor in 43% of surgical
adverse events,3 and a recent surgeon review of 444 surgical
malpractice claims identified 81 communication break-
downs among 60 of these claims, 92% of which were verbal
interchanges or events.4
Unfortunately, ineffective communication is not uncom-
mon in the OR. In an observational study of general and vas-
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The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surg‘‘communication failures,’’ as defined by poor timing, inac-
curate or incomplete information, failure to include key team
members or failure to resolve issues, in 31% of OR commu-
nications. A third of these failures resulted in demonstrable
inefficiency, increased cognitive workload, interruption of
flow, and increased tension, as well as wasted resources. De-
spite their negative impact on the work environment, such
failures may remain unresolved, because staff members of-
ten use process work-arounds that may solve immediate
challenges but do not address long-term systemic inadequa-
cies.6 Specifically, within the domain of cardiovascular sur-
gery, our group has previously shown that communication
failures adversely affect technical surgical performance.7
Unfortunately, consistent with the observations of others,
we have also found that only a third of nonphysician care-
givers in our ORs consider surgeon communication to be
effective.8,9
The cardiovascular surgical OR is clearly a high-conse-
quence environment; it is also a high-risk environment.
The cardiovascular surgical OR is characterized by a high
degree of complexity with respect to both human–technol-
ogy interfaces and human–human interfaces. In addition to
sophisticated technologies such as cardiopulmonary bypass
(CPB) machines, individuals filling as many as 9 different
roles (surgeon, resident, perfusionist, anesthesiologist,ery c February 2010
Abbreviations and Acronyms
ACT ¼ activated clotting time
CPB ¼ cardiopulmonary bypass
NASA TLX ¼ National Aeronautics and Space
Administration Task Load Index
OR ¼ operating room
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nurse, scrub technician, surgical assistant, and cardiologist)
must interact successfully to deliver the desired outcome.10
We sought to examine a critical axis of communication be-
tween individuals, surgeons and perfusionists, who in turn
must effectively deal cooperatively with a technologic inter-
face, the heart–lung machine. Along this communication
axis, there is potential for catastrophic miscommunication
as a result of divergent interpretations of colloquial lan-
guage, vocal accents, differing levels of experience, and
lack of familiarity.11
The discipline of military and commercial aviation has ad-
dressed similar challenges by instituting protocol-driven
communication and a ‘‘sterile cockpit’’ rule during periods
of high risk and high mental workload. These periods in-
clude taxi, takeoff, and landing. During these events, nones-
sential activities are prohibited, and discussion in the cockpit
must be exclusively related to handling the aircraft. Once
cruising altitude has been achieved, the risk decreases and
the pilots may discuss whatever they please.12 Standardized
communication protocols or standard phraseology were de-
veloped to decrease ambiguity and expedite the communica-
tion process between pilots and air traffic control,13 as was
uniform application of repetition or ‘‘call-back’’ of critical
information.12
There is general enthusiasm for applying strategies from
aviation directly to medical care, and the application of the
sterile cockpit concept to the OR has been suggested. An im-
plicit prerequisite for the evidence-based transfer of such
a concept to the clinical domain, however, is the clear defi-
nition of periods of high mental workload. As a first step, we
sought to determine the applicability of the same principles
to the cardiovascular surgical OR by mapping critical events
as well as cognitive demands among all members of the OR
team throughout a surgical procedure. On the basis of these
findings, we further developed and implemented a protocol-
based communication tool specifically for the surgeon–per-
fusionist axis and assessed its impact on the effectiveness of
communication.MATERIALS AND METHODS
Assessment of Mental Workload
We assed the level of cognitive workload during an entire cardiac surgi-
cal procedure from the perspective of all involved staff with the NationalThe Journal of Thoracic and CaAeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index (NASA TLX),
a validated tool to measure mental workload.14 The NASA TLX was admin-
istered to 30 cardiovascular OR staff, including perfusionists, certified reg-
istered nurse anesthetists, surgical assistants, surgical technicians, and
circulating nurses. One NASA TLX was filled out for each of 8 different
stages of surgery (preparation, induction, opening, initiation of CPB, surgi-
cal repair, termination of CPB, closure, and postoperative), giving a stage-
by-stage assessment of mental workload. Scores were assessed separately
for representatives of each role.
Assessment of Critical Stages
Critical stages of a typical cardiac surgical case were used to identify crit-
ical stages of a typical cardiovascular surgical case in general and of a typical
CPB run in particular through semistructured focus groups with surgeons
and perfusionists. For the CPB interval, stages were assessed for critical
communication required and informally assessed for potential risk should
communication break down. Eight critical events common to most CPB
runs were determined. Standard phraseology for each critical stage was
also explored through interview with experienced perfusionists, who were
asked to determine the desired general structure and content for each stage.
After several iterations, a final communication protocol was developed.
During the implementation period, the protocol was posted on the wall op-
posite the consultant surgeon in the OR in large font on 2 laminated sheets of
8.53 11-inch paper. The perfusionist was also provided with a copy to keep
at the heart–lung machine. This was done to ensure that implementation of
the protocol did not further increase mental workload by forcing the surgical
team members to remember a ‘‘script.’’
Collection and Analysis of Communication
Exchanges
Observations were made at St Marys Hospital at Mayo Clinic, Rochester,
Minn, with the consent of all surgeons and staff members. Institutional re-
view board approval was granted for a minimal risk study with study-spe-
cific consent by patients waived. Observations were made by 1 of 2
independent observers (R.K.W., S.H.P.), with details of exchanges recorded
manually. Before implementation of the protocol, communication ex-
changes between cardiac surgeon and perfusionist were recorded verbatim
in 18 cardiovascular surgical cases during CPB to assess the forms and fre-
quency of miscommunication. The protocol was then implemented in 16
cardiovascular surgical cases, and communication exchanges between car-
diac surgeon and perfusionist were again monitored and recorded during
CPB. Cases observed were a convenience sample from among the elective
operative schedule of 6 cardiovascular surgeons.
Communication exchanges between cardiac surgeon and perfusionist be-
fore and after implementation of the standard communication protocol were
categorized as either no issue or as one of the following types of communi-
cation breakdowns: (1) miscues, (2) no call-back (either surgeon or perfu-
sionist), (3) repeated communication exchanges, (4) occurrence of
a nonverbalized critical action, and (5) ambiguous or unstructured commu-
nication exchanges. These categorizations were determined before observa-
tions on the basis of our previous work in the cardiac surgical OR.
Definitions of categories are shown in Table 1. Categorization of each com-
munication event as no issue, miscue, no call-back, repeated communication
event, occurrence of nonverbalized critical action, or ambiguous or unstruc-
tured communication event was validated by independent categorization by
2 raters (R.K.W., S.H.P.), and agreement was determined. Observed com-
munication exchange data were also used to determine the frequency at
which no communication or poor communication occurred during each crit-
ical stage.
Statistical Analysis
The number of cases observed was based on predetermined approxima-
tions of sample sizes that would give 80% power at a .05 level ofrdiovascular Surgery c Volume 139, Number 2 313
TABLE 1. Communication breakdown definitions
Type of breakdown Definition
No call-back Exchanges between surgeon and perfusionist in which confirmatory call-back of action or
instruction did not occur
Repeated communication exchange A communication exchange that must be repeated
Nonverbalized critical action Occurrence of actions that were not communicated between surgeon and perfusionist
Ambiguous or unstructured communication exchange Communication exchanges that do not include specific instructions, (eg, cardioplegia given
antegrade or retrograde)
Miscues Surgeon or perfusionist not clearly hearing communication exchanges or requests from one
another, either because of volume or because of confusion
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cies of types of communication breakdown between cardiac surgeon and
perfusionist before and after implementation of the standardized communi-
cation protocol. A rank sum Wilcox test was used to compare mean number
of communication breakdowns.
RESULTS
Mental Workload
The results of the NASA TLX showed widely divergent
cognitive workload measures during the course of a typical
case, as shown in Figure 1. For example, during induction
and intubation, workload is high for anesthesia but not for
other disciplines. Although this is clearly a high-risk inter-
val, commonly individuals in other disciplines will be focus-
ing on their own work during this period, often chatting,
preparing or counting instruments on the sterile table, or
so on, which may challenge the mental focus of the anesthe-
sia staff. These results suggest that, in contrast to the circum-
stance in aviation, there is no discrete time period that may
be conveniently defined as the principal period of high-
risk and high mental workload from the standpoint of the en-
tire team.Mental Workload in the Operating Room
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FIGURE 1. Results of National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Task Load Index (NASA TLX) show widely divergent cognitive workload
measures during course of typical case. CRNA, certified registered nurse
anesthetist; CST, certified surgical technologist; RN, registered nurse;
Prep, surgical preparation; Postop, postoperative.
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Protocols
With the focus group methodology, consensus was
reached among staff (cardiac surgeons and perfusionists) re-
garding the critical common events during CPB as shown in
Table 2, including (1) establishment of activated clotting
time (ACT), (2) circuit check, (3) initiation of CPB, (4)
crossclamp on, (5) administration of cardioplegia, (6) vent
on and off, (7) crossclamp off, and (8) termination of
CPB. It is important to note that although these critical stages
are evident across most case types, some cases may not re-
quire the use of every single stage.
After definition of the 8 critical events, a communication
protocol was developed that was directed toward delineation
of the vital information that needed to be exchanged at each
stage and establishment of a structured means to convey this
information. Specifically, the format of the exchange in-
cluded specific information pertaining to the case, rather
than vague indicators. For example, for the critical step of
‘‘ACT adequate for CPB,’’ the protocol called for the nu-
meric ACT level to be given, rather than merely stating ‘‘ad-
equate for CPB.’’ Furthermore, on the basis of the principles
noted previously, call-back of all exchanges was instituted
as a standard procedure. There was considerable debate re-
garding whether specific communication protocols should
be developed for each procedure type; however, it was deter-
mined that for the sake of enhanced utility and adoption a sin-
gle universal communication protocol should be used.Communication Breakdowns
Eighteen cardiovascular surgical cases were observed be-
fore implementation of the communication protocol and 16TABLE 2. Critical stages of cardiopulmonary bypass
Activated clotting time adequate, arterial line check
Circuit check
Initiation of cardiopulmonary bypass
Crossclamp on
Cardioplegia updates
Vent updates
Crossclamp off
Termination of cardiopulmonary bypass
ery c February 2010
TABLE 3. Classification of observed procedure types
Procedure
Preimplementation
cases
Postimplementation
cases
CABG 5 4
CABG with valve repair 2 2
Valve repair or replacement 6 7
Descending or ascending
aorta repair
3 0
Other 2 3
CABG, Coronary artery bypass grafting.
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performed by 6 different surgeons. Before implementation,
communication exchanges between cardiac surgeon and
perfusionist were observed and recorded for a total of 29.6
hours (1775 minutes) of CBP time. After implementation,
communication exchanges were observed for a total of
23.9 hours (1433 minutes). The average durations of CPB
before and after implementation (98.6 vs 89.5 minutes,
P ¼ .55) and cases mixes were similar (Table 3).
With regard specifically to the 8 critical stages, break-
downs before implementation most frequently concerned
application (65% of cases) or removal (65% of cases) of
the aortic crossclamp (Figure 2). Of note, the breakdowns re-
lated to application of the crossclamp were entirely due to
lack of verbalization, whereas breakdowns on removal
were not verbalized in 47% of cases, were ambiguous in
12%, and were without call-back or acknowledgment in
6%. In addition, in 22% of cases there was no verbalized
confirmation of an adequately functioning circuit (satisfac-
tory arterial line pressure oxygenation, etc). Perhaps of
greater concern, there was no verbalized assurance regarding
an adequate ACT for CPB in 11% of cases.
After implementation of the communication protocol, the
frequency of ineffective communication of the critical
events improved. Specifically, the frequency of a missed
verbalized circuit check was 6% of cases, which marked
a significant decrease from 22% of cases before implemen-
tation. No or poor verbalization concerning the aortic cross-
clamp remained rather common at 33% after use of the
protocol, although this was much improved from the level
before the institution of the protocol. Furthermore, verbal-TABLE 4. Changes in communication breakdowns
Variable Preimplementation
Total communication
breakdowns
11.5
Nonverbalized critical actions 1.6
Repeated communication 1.4
No call-back 3.9
Miscues 1.2
Ambiguous or unstructured
communication exchanges
3.4
Preimplementation and postimplementation values represent breakdowns per case.
The Journal of Thoracic and Caization that the crossclamp had been removed occurred in
all cases after implementation, in contrast lack of verbaliza-
tion in 65% of case before implementation.
Moreover, communication improved broadly after imple-
mentation of the protocol. Overall, during the 18 preimple-
mentation cases, 632 total communication exchanges
occurred between cardiac surgeon and perfusionist. During
the 16 postimplementation cases, 748 total communication
exchanges were observed. The average numbers of commu-
nication exchanges per case were similar between preimple-
mentation and postimplementation groups (35.1 vs 46.8,
P ¼ .06). The total frequency of communication break-
downs per case decreased significantly after implementation
of the communication protocol (11.5 vs 7.3, P ¼ .008).
Examples of a nonverbalized critical action included the
perfusionist turning on the left ventricular vent when the sur-
geon wanted it off, the surgeon removing the crossclamp
without informing the perfusionists, or initiation of rewarm-
ing without a shared understanding. After the introduction of
the communication protocol, nonverbalized critical actions
per case were reduced by approximately 75% (1.6 vs 0.4,
P ¼ .004). In addition, the number of communication ex-
changes that required repetition per case decreased apprecia-
bly with the communication protocol (1.4 vs 0.3, P¼ .042).
Call-backs are often used between surgeon and perfusion-
ist to verify communication exchanges within this communi-
cation axis. The frequency per case at which call-backs did
not occur between surgeon and perfusionist decreased
26% in the postimplementation group, but this difference
was not statistically significant (3.9 vs 2.9, P ¼ .20). Mis-
cues were defined as surgeon or perfusionist incorrectly
hearing or interpreting a communication exchange or re-
quest. There was no appreciable difference in the frequency
of miscues between preimplementation and postimplemen-
tation groups (1.2 vs 1.4, P ¼ .57). Examples of ambiguous
or unstructured communication exchanges included the sur-
geon requesting cardioplegia without specifying dose or an-
tegrade versus retrograde and vague or nonspecific
communication exchanges (such as ‘‘off,’’ ‘‘up,’’ or
‘‘down’’) that elicited a confused response from the perfu-
sionist. Ambiguous or unstructured communication ex-
changes per case decreased 32% after implementation ofPostimplementation Change P value
7.3 -37% .008
0.4 -75% .004
0.3 -79% .042
2.9 -26% .20
1.4 16% .57
2.3 -32% .67
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Proportion of Cases with Communication Breakdowns 
at Each of 8 “Critical Events”
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FIGURE 2. Proportions of cases with communication breakdowns at each
of 8 critical events defined in study. ACT, Activated clotting time; X-clamp,
aortic crossclamp.
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statistical significance (3.4 vs 2.3, P ¼ .67).DISCUSSION
The results of this study demonstrate that, in contrast to
aviation, there is no discrete time interval of high risk and
high mental workload in cardiac surgery that can be defined
during which a sterile cockpit rule can be readily imple-
mented. Because of the overall complexity of a surgical pro-
cedure and the diversity of tasks to be accomplished by
individuals with different roles throughout the procedure,
an alternative approach focusing on ‘‘critical events’’ rather
than a ‘‘critical time interval’’ may be more useful. Further-
more, our study suggests that a structured focus on commu-
nication around such events can have a positive effect
beyond the events themselves, with an improvement in the
quality of communication in general. Although the interven-
tion tested here focused only on the surgeon–perfusionist
axis, the tool could likely be expanded to include the other
critical events in the OR, including intubation, surgical
pause or incision, instrument and sponge counts, and so on.
We have previously demonstrated that disruptions in the
flow of the operation, particularly those related to communi-
cation failure, correlate with technical error.7 We have also
demonstrated that a preoperative briefing can reduce mis-
communication events by half even when introduced with
a highly familiar team.15 This study builds on these findings
while focusing specifically on the surgeon–perfusionist axis.
We have demonstrated a significant opportunity to improve
performance, with almost a third of exchanges between sur-
geon and perfusionist judged suboptimal. Furthermore,
a simple, low-cost intervention that did not depend on
expensive technology was able to affect the measured
outcome, reducing miscommunication by half. The316 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgcommunication protocol was deliberately generic, designed
for applicability across a broad range of cases.
The communication protocol had its greatest effect by di-
minishing nonverbalized critical actions and repeated com-
munication exchanges, suggesting that the protocol served
as an aid particularly during stages of high mental workload.
In particular, application and removal of the crossclamp oc-
cur during a period of high mental workload for both the sur-
geon and perfusionist and are accordingly at high risk for
loss of situational awareness as a result of task focus. The
protocol established a reminder to the surgeon to be aware
of the perfusionist’s ‘‘need to know’’ and also set an expec-
tation by the perfusionist for receipt of a communication
event. The latter may account for the improvement in re-
peated exchanges. Both the reduction in ambiguous commu-
nication exchanges, as defined by absence of quantitatively
specific instructions, and the improvement in adherence to
call-back during communication exchanges were modest.
Call-backs are particularly problematic behaviorally, be-
cause they tend to benefit the initiator of the communication,
allowing verification that the receiver has heard the commu-
nication exchange. Therefore the onus is on the receiver to
respond, yet a response may not seem necessary if the recip-
ient feels that he or she has adequately heard and understood
the communication. The occurrence of miscues actually ap-
peared to increase modestly; however, this difference was
not statistically significant.
Quantification of the potential impact of this intervention
on adverse events is difficult; however, it is well documented
that failures in communication are frequent contributors to
adverse events.1-3 It is therefore reasonable to anticipate
that improvement in communication generally will reduce
the risk of error and, when an error occurs, improve the abil-
ity of the team to identify and recover from it. As stated by
Salas and colleagues,16 communication is a fundamental el-
ement of effective teamwork, along with coordination and
cooperation. Accordingly, express attention to communica-
tion through the introduction of protocol-based communica-
tion can reasonably be expected to promote active
engagement of all team members, with the resultant benefits
of mutual performance monitoring, mutual support, team
orientation, and cohesion. Our previous work has demon-
strated that the state of teamwork in general, and communi-
cation specifically, is not perceived positively by all
members of the OR team, and in fact are thought to be
poor by as many as half of the nonphysician staff members.8
Our admittedly anecdotal experience during this study was
that the OR team was more engaged and willing to speak
up with concerns for patient safety when the importance of
effective communication was acknowledged and valued.
Research in other high consequence industries has
demonstrated several critical characteristics of high reliability
organizations.17 These organizations are characterized
by the mindful management of operations through (1)ery c February 2010
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(2) reluctance to simplify interactions, (3) sensitivity to op-
erations, (4) a commitment to resilience, and (5) deference
to operational expertise. Effective communication is an es-
sential precondition to all of these factors, and in our opinion
communication improvement demands a conscious and in-
tentional approach with consideration of lessons learned in
such other high consequence industries as nuclear power,
aviation, and the military.
There are significant limitations to this study. The study
was performed in a single institution and with a small num-
ber of surgeons who were inclined to accept the value of im-
proved communication among team members. We were,
however, able to include a diversity of different surgeon–
perfusionist communication dyads, as well as a large number
of case types. A second limitation was the availability of
only 2 human factor observers, with no technical capability
to continuously record the actual exchanges in such a manner
that they could be ‘‘over read’’ or reviewed by other inves-
tigators. Both observers kept word-for-word records of the
communications between the surgeon and the perfusionist,
however, leaving the judgment of what did and did not con-
stitute a communication breakdown for later coding analysis
and discussion. Coding was performed independently, with
results compared only after all the data had been analyzed.
Finally, there is no means of accounting for the potential
for the Hawthorne effect of improved performance simply
because observers are present. This effect, however, would
have been expected to improve communication both before
and after institution of the protocol and should not, therefore,
invalidate our positive results.
More broadly, the results are limited by the interval of ob-
servation and the difficulty in assessing adherence to the pro-
tocol with time and its lasting impact on behavior in the OR.
True change in the culture of a complex environment is grad-
ual, and there is a tremendous pull toward return to the stable
state that existed before the intervention. Effective surgical
leadership is critical if such changes are to be incorporated
into the fabric of the environment. Perhaps the most impor-
tant element is demonstration to surgical trainees of the im-
portance and impact of effective communication exchange
as a critical element of teamwork.
In summary, the results of this study demonstrate that in
light of the complexity of cardiovascular care in the OR,
a sterile cockpit approach based on the definition of a critical
time interval is not as applicable as is an approach focused
on critical events. Furthermore, the institution of such a pro-
tocol had a positive effect on communication throughout the
procedure. Similar protocols should be readily customizable
to most practice environments, with no significant disruption
to the flow of the procedure itself because they do not con-
stitute a pause or checklist, and such interventions have
the potential to significantly improve outcomes.The Journal of Thoracic and CaWe gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Jeffrey Riley, CCP,
in the phase of data collection, as well as the generous and patient
support of the entire OR staff during conduct of this study.References
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Dr James I. Fann (Palo Alto, Calif). Dr Sundt, thank you for
a comprehensive and compelling presentation on this patient safety
issue. The concept of sterile cockpit is well established in the field
of aviation, with Federal Aviation Administration regulations
specifically mandating that pilots refrain from nonessential activi-
ties during critical phases of flight. In the context of surgery, on first
pass, one might consider the sterile cockpit model to be applicable
because of the common perception that the surgeon has a role anal-
ogous to that of the pilot. But is this aviation model of the sterile
cockpit directly applicable to the cardiac surgical environment?rdiovascular Surgery c Volume 139, Number 2 317
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protocol, is thoughtfully analyzed in this study.
Errors in surgery and in medicine in general often can be traced
to errors in communication, as was mentioned, but such generalities
regarding the need for more effective communication have not pre-
viously translated into a well-designed study or a practical protocol
for improvement in the field of cardiothoracic surgery. The surgical
checklist, for instance, which is also based on the aviation model,
focuses on preoperative and postoperative debriefing and has
been shown to reduce errors and improve patient outcomes. Further
improvement in surgical outcomes will require us to recognize
other complex intraoperative components that make up the cardiac
surgical environment.
The importance of this study is twofold. It graphically demon-
strates the divergence and complexity of tasks among the diverse
team members. In effect, in the cardiac surgery environment, in
terms of the cognitive workload, instead of having a single cockpit
as is the case with aviation has multiple cockpits, with implications
for patient safety. It is well recognized that there are 3 tribes in the
surgical suite: anesthesia, surgery, and nursing. Additionally, in the
cardiac OR there is a subtribe, if you will, represented by the com-
plex interaction between the perfusionist and the surgeon. So in this
study the analysis focused on the surgical tribe in the surgical cock-
pit. Critical to our understanding of patient safety issues, the proto-
col for communication during CPB between the surgeon and the
perfusionist has been established to some degree.
First, Dr Sundt, in your analysis of the cognitive workload of
various participants in cardiac surgery and your use of the sterile
cockpit analogy, you propose that we regard critical events as op-
posed to critical intervals as being more appropriate. My first ques-
tion relates to the definition of ‘‘critical’’ and whether there is
a measurable threshold for such definition, in view of the variability
of what a given surgeon or anesthesiologist would consider a critical
event. Is there a reliable threshold for what you would consider
a critical event, given the variability of tasks and perceptions?
Dr Sundt. It’s hard to know the answer to that. We did it on the
basis of the potential impact of a problem at the time of that event, if
you will, a consensus agreement on the potential for harm. If we
screwed that step up, how bad would it be? We also looked at
how often there were miscommunications surrounding a given
event. I agree with you that this is an issue with all of this kind
of science, or social science. It is hard to measure these things.
Now if we accept that there is no standardized or completely objec-
tive way to determine critical events, the implication is that there
are multiple definitions. I can personally accept the notion that
from institution to institution the definitions of those critical events
may vary somewhat. But there is a limit, too. If the definitions vary
from OR to OR, from surgeon to surgeon, from anesthesiologist to
anesthesiologist, then we basically have the very state that we have
right now, which may work if one always has the exact same team
and everyone knows the definitions. But I don’t think that is going
to be an adequate answer in the long run. I think that in the end we
need to come to some agreements, at least within our own work
groups. It is an interactive process. In our institution, we work on
it, modify, and I think that we can come to some kind of common
ground in that way.
Dr Fann. Most surgeons and perfusionists have developed an
effective working relationship and means of communication with318 The Journal of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgrespect to terminology, phraseology, call-back, nuances, and so
on. Given the number of surgeons and perfusionists in the study,
did you find in your subanalysis that there tended to a breakdown
in communication with particular combinations of surgeons and
perfusionists? If so, the communication protocol you developed
is actually a means of remediation for those individuals.
Dr Sundt. The surgeons and perfusionists involved in this study
were a subset of individuals who were open to doing this, so if any-
thing they are probably the people who were going to be most pli-
able and for whom the communication was already most reliable. I
mentioned the issue about ACT. If I can digress for a moment, we
changed a heparin administration protocol not too long ago, and the
next week I got complaints, ‘‘Oh, with this change we almost went
on CPB several times without giving heparin.’’ The question was,
how could this possibly happen? I asked the perfusionists how they
could institute CPB without an adequate ACT. The response I got
from the perfusionist was, ‘‘Well, Dr So-and-So goes on CPB with-
out asking what the ACT is.’’ I have to admit I asked the perfusion-
ist, ‘‘What do you mean Dr So-and-so goes on CPB? Aren’t you the
perfusionist? Aren’t you the one who turns on the machine?’’ Of
course, the perfusionists are not personally at fault—this is the cul-
ture in our institution, and I’ll bet that we are not unique. So I think
the answer to your question is that there are definitely very strong
differences among the surgeons regarding how open they are to
communication and how open the communication is in their
ORs. And, yes, I think that addressing this issue is very much the
intent of the work, to try and smooth that out. Because poor com-
munication in one OR spills over and affects what happens in an-
other OR.
Dr Fann. We know that when things get tough during surgery
such technically difficult components of the case are not always
known to the rest of the team because of inability of anyone but
the surgeon in many cases to visualize the situation and because
of the unpredictable nature of some of these events. In these situa-
tions, the surgeon would often communicate the critical nature of
the event to the rest of the team to minimize the amount of back-
ground noise and distraction. So, because of the unpredictable na-
ture of the critical events, especially during a long operation, and
the nature of multiple cockpits, based on your observations, have
you identified effective or not so effective methods that surgeons
use to communicate such critical events?
Dr Sundt. I think that the important principle there is that the
surgeon needs to communicate the criticality of the situation in
a way that actively engages everyone in the room, rather than dis-
engaging everyone in the room. Maybe this is more in the realm of
opinion than fact, but if we throw an instrument and it makes every-
body afraid to speak up, then we actually have not accomplished
our goal. Our goal really was to get everybody’s head in the
game. Instead, what we just got by throwing an instrument was
for everybody to check out of the room. There are better ways to
command attention. I think that we have all seen role models for
this in our training, people who commanded the attention of those
around them with their quiet manner. I think that is probably the
most effective way to get everybody actively engaged.
Dr Fann. Finally, what are the implications of your findings for
crew resource management training and crisis management training
in current patient simulation training? That is, crew resource man-
agement has been effective in anesthesia simulation, but simulationery c February 2010
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well. Please comment on this issue.
Dr Sundt. We are beginning to explore the use of simulation in
that axis. Harold Burkhart will actually discuss some of that tomor-
row, I think. We have a perfusion simulator in our simulation center
and are trying to get surgeons and perfusionists together there to
look at what those interactions are and how they occur.
Dr Kent Jones (Salt Lake City, Utah). I’ll be brief; I just have
one question. In you showed improvement in all categories except
that designated as miscues.
Dr Sundt. Miscues.The Journal of Thoracic and CaDr Jones. Yes. Would you not have expected that area to
improve with all the other categories that did show improvement?
Dr Sundt. The single category that did not show an improve-
ment was miscues. The difference between the frequencies was
not statistically significant, for what statistical significance is worth.
I would expect that certainly not to have been worse, so I can make
the excuse that it was not a statistically significant difference. The
incidence of those miscues was already pretty low, perhaps because
there was a Hawthorne effect in this. Everybody knew what we
were doing in the room, and so they were paying more attention,
but it turned out that the difference was not statistically significant.rdiovascular Surgery c Volume 139, Number 2 319
